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372 YALE LA W JO URNAL. 

Ferries — Establishment by a Combination of Persons for Their Own 
Benefit— Tanner v. Warren, 56 S. W. 167 Ky. 1. — A number of persons com- 
bined and bought a boat for the convenience of themselves and their families 
in crossing a stream within the prohibited distance of an exclusive ferry priv- 
ilege. Held, that there was a violation of the privilege, and an injunction 
would lie. Du Rella, J., dissenting. 

It is difficult to see just where the courts draw the line as to what will 
constitute an infringement of a ferry privilege. The cases show that it 
is no infringement for a person to transport his own property in his own 
boat. Alexandria, etc., Ferry Co. v. IVisch, 73 Mo. 655; Trent v. Car- 
tersville Bridge Co., 11 Leigh (Va.) 521. One case, at least, hold that 
this right may be even extended to the transporting of employees, guests and 
friends. Hunter v. Moore, 44 Ark. 184. In the case stated the combination for 
the express purpose of avoiding the ferriage was undoubtedly the ground upon 
which the decision was based. 

Fire Insurance — Contract— Policy— Delivery— Proof of Loss— Waiver 
— Hicks v. British America Assur. Co., 56 N. E. 743 (N. Y.). — A plaintiff 's 
assignor had a conversation with defendant's local agent, and made a contract 
of present insurance for $2,500 upon his property. Two days later said prop- 
erty was destroyed by fire, and before the standard policy was received. 
When notified of the loss, defendant's agent denied that a verbal contract was 
made, but the agreement was conclusively proved in court. Plaintiff suing on 
breach of contract, defendant holds that the verbal contract embraced the 
conditions of the standard policy of fire insurance, which states that a proof 
of loss must be shown within sixty days after the fire. Plaintiff admits that 
he neglected to do this, but claims that the suit being for breach of contract, 
such proof of loss is immaterial. Held, the failure of defendant's agent to issue 
a standard policy and his denial of the contract was not a waiver of defend- 
ant's' right to the provisions of the policy requiring a proof of loss. Landon, 
Werner and Haight, J. J., dissenting. 

In the cases of Angellw. Insurance Co., 59 N. Y. 171, and Ellis v. In- 
surance Co., 50 (N. Y.) 402, it was held that an agent had authority to make a 
verbal contract of insurance and that "recovery of the amount to be insured is 
proper, as damages for the breach of such contract." The court overrules these 
decisions on the ground that they were made before the Legislature had pre- 
scribed a standard policy of fire insurance in the State. 

Judge Werner, in his dissenting opinion, contends that since the agent 
denied the verbal contract, plaintiff could regard it as rescinded and sue for 
breach. Stokes v. Mackay, 41 N. E. 496. 

Growing Crops— Attaching Creditors — Case on Shares — Curtner v. 
Syndow. 60 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 462— Where rent for leased land was to be paid 
in a proportion of the crops, and the lessor assigned his interest in the growing 
crops to a third person. Held, as to the assignor's attaching creditors, the 
growing crops were personal property and title passed to assignee. 

Much conflict of authority exists respecting the question of growing crops. 
Tiedeman Real Prop. § 201 holds the lessor in a cropping contract has no 
vested interest in the crop, as such; his title vesting only after apportionment 
and delivery, to the same effect. Aiken v. Smith, 21 Vt. 181; Pickens v. Webs- 
ter, 31 La. Ann. 870, holds the uncut crops under such an agreement subject to 
the lessee's creditors; also does Howard Co. v. Kyte, 28 N. W. Rep. (la.) 609, 
and Long v. Leavers, 103 Pa. St. 517. In support of the present case see Pope 
v. Hurtle, 14 Cal. 403. 

Habeas Corpus— Extradition — Treaty Stipulations — Cohn v. Jones, 100. 
Fed. Rep. 639. — Plaintiff was extradited from Canada upon an information 
charging arson for the burning of a house, further described as in the occupa- 



RECENT CASES. 373 

tion of a shoe company. In the treaty it was stipulated that there should be 
no liability for any but the offense surrendered for. The alleged house was in 
fact a store, the burning of which was statutory arson in Iowa, but not arson 
at all in Canada. Held, the action of the Canadian authorities in giving over 
the prisoner was conclusive and habeas corpus was refused. 

Indians — Capacity to Sue — Ejectment — Johnson v. Long Island R. Co., 
56 N. E. 992. (N. Y.). — Plaintiff, a member of the Montauk tribe of Indians, 
brought action in ejectment on behalf of himself and any members of the tribe 
who would come in and contribute to the expense. Held, that Indian tribes 
are wards of the State and generally speaking are possessed of only such 
rights to appear and litigate in courts of justice as are conferred on them by 
statue, Vann and Landon, J. J., dissent. 

Where the jurisdiction depends on the subject matter of the controversy 
and not upon the status of the parties, the weight of authority seems to favor 
the right of an Indian to a standing in both the United States courts and the 
State courts. Wiley v. Keokuk, 6 Kan. 94; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U. S.) 403. 

Internal Revenue — Stamp Tax — Bonds of Saloon Keepers — United 
States v Owens, District Court, E. D, Missouri, Fed. Rep. 160, Page 170. — 
The question presented by the demurrer to the information in this case is 
whether a dramshop keeper's bond, given pursuant to the provisions of the 
State of Missouri, is subject to the stamp tax of 50 cents imposed by the war 
revenue act of 1898 (Inter Alia) upon all " Bonds of any description, except 
such as may be required in legal proceedings not otherwise provided for in 
this section." 

Held, that a bond given by a saloon keeper, as one of the conditions of 
the granting by the State of a license, is an instrumentality employed by the 
State to execute and enforce its own laws in the exercise of its police powers, 
and does not require an internal revenue stamp, under the war revenue act of 
1898. The most notable point in this case is the fact that the Court construes 
the bond as a part of the license. It is a well established rule that the license 
itself is exempt from the stamp tax. The court maintains that the license 
does not express the entire contract between the State and saloon keeper; but 
that the bond and license taken together, constitute the contract or license, 
therefore, as part of the license, is not liable to be taxed. 

Judgment — Bar— Libel and Slander — Corporations — Union Associated 
Press v. Heath, 63 N. Y. Supp. 96. — The Associated Press had published a 
libel on the Union Associated Press by sending it to its correspondents. For 
that publication a recovery was had against the Associated Press by the Union 
Associated Press. The defendant in this case was a publisher to whom the 
Associated Press had sent the libel, and he had republished it. Held, that the 
judgment against the Associated Press was no bar to a recovery against him. 
Van Brunt, P. J., and McLaughlin, J., dissenting. 

Though the libel be the same, yet a different publication will give another 
cause of action. Every publication must be regarded as a new and distinct 
injury. Wood v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 498. A recovery for the wrong by the 
first publisher of a libel is not a satisfaction for the second publication. Wood 
v. Pangburn (supra). The dissenting justices maintain that the recovery 
against the Associated Press precludes further recovery from other publishers, 
as the act of sending the article, and the actual publication of it by the recip- 
ient, constitute a simple wrong, for which one recovery would be a complete 
satisfaction as to all. Knapp v. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329; Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N. 
Y. 412. The prevailing opinion seems supported by the greater weight of 
authority.